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RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS:





Explanations of violent religious conflicts usually focus on preconditions, facilitator 
causes or precipitating events at micro, meso or macro levels of analysis. As social 
psychology is the scientific study of the ways in which thoughts, feelings, 
perceptions, motives, and behaviors are inf luenced by interactions and 
transactions between groups and individuals, it can increase our understanding 
of the dynamics of religious conflicts at micro and meso levels. In this paper, 
I illustrate this point with a discussion of the utility of social movement theory for 
understanding the dynamics of religious conflicts. Social movement theory locates 
religious conflicts within broader contexts and complex processes by focusing 
on the interplay between micro and meso factors and the ways in which people 
perceive macro factors. Given certain conditions, religion can and often do con-
tribute to collective violence. Religion is rarely, if ever, the main cause of intergroup 
conflicts, but is often used as an instrument for the mobilization of human and 
non-human resources. Appeal to religion may help conflicting parties overcome 
the collective action problem associated with intergroup conflicts. This does not 
necessarily mean that religious conflicts have unique characteristics or a logic of 
their own that sets them apart from other types of intergroup conflicts. 
Keywords: Religion, conflict, violence, social psychology
INTRODUCTION
Religious conflicts are globally widespread and they tend to be more lethal, 
indiscriminate, and intractable than their secular counterparts (Fox, 2004; 
Pearce, 2005; Hassner, 2009; Toft, Philpott & Shaw, 2011; Svensson, 2007; 
2012; Svensson & Nilsson, 2018; Isaacs, 2016; 2017). In the light of these 
findings, it is not surprising to find that the question of why people engage 
in religious conflicts have drawn attention from social scientists and scholars 
of religion. Several scholars argue that religion – or specific interpretations 
of religion – is a major cause of violence because it is absolutistic or 
particularistic (e.g., Hick, 1989; Kimball, 2002; Schwartz, 1997), irrational or 
non-rational (e.g., Appleby, 2000; Selengut, 2003; Jones, 2008), and/or divisive 
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(e.g., Huntington, 1996; Avalos, 2005: Juergensmeyer, 2008; 2017). There are 
a number of problems with this conclusion (in addition to the difficulty in 
clearly distinguishing religious from non-religious motives), including the 
assumption that religious cognition has a direct impact on people’s 
behavior, the de-contextualization of religion (or religious actors), and the 
reduction of the causes of conflicts into a single causal factor.
Studies on the link between religious beliefs and behavior are inconclusive, 
with some finding that religious beliefs have an impact on people’s behavior 
while others have shown a lack of correspondence between religious beliefs and 
behavior (e.g., Wulff, 1997). An extensive body of empirical research 
demonstrates that religion’s influence on behavior is more in the situation 
than in the person (e.g., Hood, Hill & Spilka, 2009; Norenzayan, 2013). 
There are reasons to believe that religion encourages intergroup conflicts, 
but only under certain conditions. It is our job, I think, as social scientists 
and scholars of religion, to clarify the conditions under which religious beliefs 
promote intergroup conflicts (Lindgren, 2016). 
Conflicts are interactive processes manifested in an actual or perceived 
incompatibility of goals between social entities, psychological processes, 
including cognitions, emotions, and motivations, and conflict behavior, such as 
the use of force to kill and injure the opponent, destruction of military or economic 
resources, verbal threats, and hostile gestures (Galtung, 1996). Religion can 
most certainly exert an influence on contradictions, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, 
motivations, and conflict behavior. But conflicts are by definition relational 
and the decision to resort to violence is usually a consequence of an 
escalation of a conflict, disillusionments with non-violent strategies, and/or a 
moral outrage at the opponent’s aggression (Della Porta, 2013; Sageman, 
2017). To understand why a religious group use violence we thus must take into 
account the political context of the conflict and the behavior of the opponent.
There is no doubt that religious beliefs have had an impact on several 
conflicts during the last four decades (Toft, Philpott & Shaw, 2011). 
Absolutism, particularism or irrationality may have contributed to the 
conflicts, but they do not explain why conflicts have broken out between 
some religious groups but not between other religious groups, who also 
have absolutistic, particularistic or irrational beliefs. The root causes of 
intergroup conflicts are always multifaceted (Barash & Webel, 2009). No single 
causal factor will therefore suffice to explain all or most cases of collective 
religious violence (Svensson, 2012). If a hypothesized causal factor, such as 
absolutism, particularism or irrationality, is present in at least two situations 
that occur under similar circumstances, and if the outcome is violence in 
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one situation and nonviolence in the other, then under most circumstances 
that factor is not a primary cause of intergroup violence. It is thus important 
to examine religious conflicts that do not occur as well as those that do occur. 
Why have, for example, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland been 
involved in violent conflicts, while Protestants and Catholics in South Africa 
and the Philippines have not been involved in such conflicts? Why do different 
religious groups sometimes live in peace for centuries and sometimes not?
Religious conflicts are often described as binary conflicts between unitary 
and bounded factions that are defined by the participants’ religious identity, and 
the participants are often portrayed as being motivated by religious beliefs. 
But all such descriptions oversimplify the complexity of most religious 
conflicts as they usually entail a combination of identities, motives, and goals. 
Religious conflict parties are seldom, if ever, homogenous groups. In the 
religious war in Maluku (1999–2004), for example, the main conflicting parties 
were divided into several subgroups, such as Muslim vigilance groups 
and Christian vigilance groups, organized Muslim militias and organized 
Christian militias, and Muslim criminal gangs and Christian criminal gangs. 
The members of these groups, who were recruited from a wide spectrum 
of social categories, used violence to achieve multiple, overlapping, and 
sometimes mutually contradictory goals. During previous field research, I 
identified four ideal types of combatants in the war: “the ideologist” (people 
who were pulled into the war by their beliefs in the ideological cause), “the 
opportunist” (people who participated in the war in order to achieve social 
and/or economic gains), “the player” (people who were attracted by the 
adventure); and “the reluctant fighter” (people who were pushed into the 
war because they saw no other options) (Lindgren, 2014). Religious identity 
labels thus tend obscure the plurality of identities that exist within conflicting 
parties. Even if it could be demonstrated that a conflict group is religiously 
homogenous, it is not at all clear that religious beliefs are the reasons for their 
conflict behavior.
To be sure, religious beliefs might motivate action, but there are also other 
motivations that drive violent behavior, for example, the attraction of war, profit 
opportunities, and thrill (Mueller, 2007). Several studies suggest that religious 
beliefs are not among the most compelling motivations in the long run and 
in combat. More important is the social dynamic within the conflict unit, the 
ties among the soldiers, the loyalty to the brothers in arms, and the urge to 
contribute to the success of the group (e.g., Kalyvas, 2006).
Still, religion can and do exert an influence on violent conflicts, for example, 
by shaping and defining the conflicting parties that are engaged in fighting. It 
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means in many cases that religion shapes people’s identities and loyalties apart 
from its beliefs (Toft, 2007; Fox, 2000). Religions, like most ideologies, 
divide people into us and them. Before Christians and Muslims can fight, 
as they did in Maluku, they must believe themselves to be Christians 
and Muslims and not divide themselves into some other categories. 
Whenever a religious divide is used as the basis of mobilization, it requires the 
suppression of the human proclivity to see other people as both “with us” on 
some measures and “not with us” on other measures.
A vast body of research demonstrates that the mere identification with a social 
group tends to trigger in-group love and out-group hostility (e.g., Tajfel, 1970; 
Castano, Yzerbut, Bourguignon & Seron, 2002; Halevy, Bornstein & Sagiv, 
2008). But to turn “them” into an “enemy”, usually requires an additional 
component, such as grievances and a process of mobilization (Basedau, 
Pfeiffer & Vüllers, 2016; Isaacs, 2016). To understand why people 
participate in religious conflicts we thus must demystify the conflicts 
by locating them within broader contexts and complex processes. The 
purpose of this paper is to discuss the utility of social movement theory for 
understanding the dynamics of religious conflicts.
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY
Social movement theory is an integrative approach that focuses on the 
relationship between institutional political actors and various forms of 
political contention. The theory emphasizes the political context in which 
social movements and rebel groups emerge, the structures through which 
people and resources are mobilized, and collective representations of the social 
world. The theory has coalesced around three concepts: opportunity structures, 
mobilizing structures, and collective action frames (McAdam, 1999).
Opportunity structure, the first theoretical component of social movement 
theory, refers to external aspects of the political environment that constrain 
or empower collective actors, such as the degree of political openness and 
the presence or absence of support groups (Tarrow, 1988). This means that the 
opportunities to engage in successful collective action varies over time and that 
these variations can explain the ebb and flow of contentious politics (McAdam, 
1999).
It is a psychological truism that we live in a perceived reality (Lindgren, 
2005; 2014b). Opportunities are subject to interpretation because no 
opportunity will invite to mobilization unless it is perceived as an 
opportunity. It is therefore important to pay attention to the interplay 
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between structural conditions and subjective perceptions. Kurzman (1996) 
points out that there are sometimes mismatches between them such that 
people fail to perceive opportunities when they do exist, or perceive 
opportunities when they do not exist. Although there is no consensus on what 
constitutes a political opportunity structure, it is clear that contentious religious 
groups are shaped by the political context and often respond strategically 
to perceived opportunity structures. Social movement theorists recognize 
that political opportunities are insufficient to persuade people to participate 
in collective action. Mobilizing structures, the second component of social 
movement theory, refers to the networks through which the mobilization 
of resources, people, and collective action occurs. It is, in other words, 
those collective vehicles, informal networks as well as formal organizations, 
through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. 
Social movement theorists also stress the importance of social networks. As 
a number of studies demonstrate, members of religious and political 
organizations are typically recruited through social networks. They seem to be 
particularly important in recruitment to high-risk activism (McAdam, 1986; 
Della Porta, 2013; Sageman, 2017). Della Porta (1988), for example, found that 70 
percent of the members of militant left-wing groups in Italy joined while they 
had at least one close friend or kin involved in the group. In a study of right-
wing terrorism in Italy, Weinberg and Eubank (1987) found that 60 percent 
of the activists had siblings in the movement, 18 percent had marital and 12 
percent had parental relations with members of the radical right. In a study of 
global jihadism, Sageman (2008, 66) found that “about two thirds of the people 
in the sample were friends with other people who joined together or already had 
some connection to terrorism.” Social networks can thus mold preferences before 
people decide to join a movement, socialize and build identities after they have been 
recruited, and offer participation opportunities to people who are sensitive to a 
particular issue (Passy, 2001). Social networks can also be an antidote to leaving a 
group and a support for sustained participation in collective actions (Della Porta 
& Diani, 2006). Friendship is thus a key to recruitment as well a key to keeping 
group members. 
Social movement theorists also stress the importance of formal 
organizations. The key challenge for social movement organizers is to create 
organizations that are sufficiently robust to structure contention, yet flexible enough 
to reach out to the social networks that link people to one another. Tarrow (2011) 
argues that the best way to address this challenge is through local organizations 
that are connected by social networks and coordinated by formal organizations. 
Local organizations can provide crucial resources to a social movement, such as 
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members, leaders, communication networks, and enterprise tools (McAdam, 
1999).
There is ample of evidence that social movements recruit participants most 
efficiently from existing organizations. It is a well-established fact that it is 
easier to recruit people with a shared sense of identity than to create new ones. 
Recruitment frequently occurs through “block recruitment” in which several 
or most members of an organization decide to join a social movement 
(Oberschall, 1973; McAdam, 1999). Social movements need leaders who 
“inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create and recognize opportunities, 
devise strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes (Morris & 
Staggenborg, 2004, 171).” Sometimes leaders produce social movements and 
sometimes social movements produce leaders out of the struggle or from existing 
organizations. Finally, established organizations may provide communication 
infrastructures, practical tools and services, such as meeting places, office 
supplies, and lawyers (McAdam, 1999). But for the aggrieved to participate 
in collective action, there must first be a cognitive liberation or an insurgent 
consciousness, that is, “a collective state of understanding which recognizes that 
social change is both imperative and viable (Smith, 1991, 62).”
Collective action is not only constructed out of organizations, but also out 
of shared understandings that justify, dignify, and animate collective action. The 
third component of social movement theory is collective action frames. The term 
“frame” refers to “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses ‘the 
world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, 
events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past 
environment. [...] Collective action frames not only perform this focusing 
and punctuating role; they also function simultaneously as modes of 
attribution and articulation (Snow & Benford, 1992, 137).” Thus, collective 
action frames define a social situation as a problem, including attributions 
of responsibility and targets of blame, articulate a proposed solution to 
the problem, devise strategies for addressing the problem, and offer a 
rational for engaging in collective action.
Collective action frames are generated by an interactive, discursive process which 
involve a “connection and alignment of events and experiences so that they 
hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion,” and “accenting and 
highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as being more salient than others 
(Benford & Snow, 2000, 623).” The framing process always occurs in a context 
in which various actors, such as social movement organizers, participants, 
authorities, media, and counter-movements, are engaged in intra-
group/movement f raming disputes  and intergroup/movement 
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counterframing/framing contests. Framing is a strategic process that aims 
to achieve a specific goal: recruitment of participants, economic resources, 
and so forth. In order to achieve the goal, a frame must resonate with potential 
participants and the wider cultural context in which a movement operates. 
Social movement scholars have demonstrated that resonance is related to cultural 
sensitivity, credibility and salience (Williams, 2004).
The process through which social movements link their interpretative 
frameworks with people’s values and goals is called frame alignment, of 
which there are four types: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame 
extension, and frame transformation. Frame bridging is linking ideologically 
congruent but structurally unconnected frames. Frame amplification refers 
to a clarification, elaboration or revitalization of cultural beliefs or values that 
relate to a specific issue. Frame extension is to extend an interpretive frame to 
include issues and concerns that are secondary to the movement’s primary goals 
but are of importance to a target population. Frame transformation, 
which is the most ambitious strategy, refers to a reformulation of 
a collective action frame or a formation of a new one (Snow, Rochford, 
Worden & Benford, 1986).
Frame alignment processes thus serve to link a movement’s activities and goals 
with a target of mobilization. Sometimes frames originate from ideologies 
and sometimes ideologies are influenced by frames. Although frames usually 
do not consist of a systematic body of ideas and ideals, some provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the social world. This is particularly true 
of master frames, that is, “collective action frames that have expanded in 
scope and influence such that they color and constrain the orientations and 
activities of other movements (Snow, 2004, 390).” Master frames that are 
broad in interpretive scope, such as global justice, war on Islam, and anti-
imperialism, allow “numerous aggrieved groups to tap it and elaborate their 
grievances in terms of its basic problem-solving schema (Snow & Benford, 1992, 
140).”
MOBILIZATION FOR RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS
Religious conflicts are willed actions and leaders usually play critical roles in 
instigating collective violence (Brass, 2003). They normally exploit popular 
grievances for economic, political or ideological gains. Some leaders thus 
mobilize along identity lines in order to advance their political or economic 
interests via conflicts, others mobilize along identity lines in order to 
advance their religious interests via conflicts (Barter & Zatkin-Osburn, 
2014). In both cases, the leaders must perceive a political opportunity and 
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mobilize human and non-human resources before they can engage in 
violent conflicts. Mobilization is facilitated when the leader is imbued with 
moral authority and embody the in-group identity. Successful leaders typically 
stand for the group, stand up for the group, craft a sense of us, and make the 
group members matter (Glenny, 1999; Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011).
Control over national mass media can have tremendous effects on conflict 
mobilization. If a conflict group can convey their action frames to millions 
of people, encouraging some to join them and others to take note of their 
claims, it becomes possible to create a large movement without incurring the 
costs of building and maintaining a mass organization. The importance of 
controlling mass media outlets has been observed in several conflict areas, 
for example, in Serbia prior to the wars against Croatia and Bosnia (Mueller 2000). 
Mass media can thus be used to win the hearts and minds of activists, supporters, 
and sympathizers. The use of religious rhetoric and symbolism can provide access 
to religious media channels. In Maluku, for example, both sides used religious 
mass media in order to mobilize human and non-human resources (Hasan, 
2006; Lindgren, 2014).
Social media has changed the nature of religious conflict in many ways. It has, 
for example, extended the range of social networks internationally and diminished 
the importance of local organizations as bases for mobilization. Social media has 
made it possible for conflict groups to bypass government censorship and the 
filters of established media outlets, and communicate directly with members, 
sympathizers, supporters, enemies, and other political actors. Most conflict 
groups today use various network platforms to disseminate information 
and propaganda, mobilize non-human resources, and recruit participants, 
sympathizers, and supporters. Armed conflicts require material resources, 
such as money, weapons, ammunition and technology. Some of the most 
common sources of funding are robbery, taxation of the local population, and 
donations from external support groups. Appeal to religion can facilitate 
mobilization of external support because people tend to support their co-
religionists when they are in trouble (Fox, 2002; Lindgren, 2014). 
Conflict groups need organizations and social networks in order to 
participate successfully in collective violence. Conflict leaders must either 
create new organizations or transform existing ones into conflict 
organizations. To frame a conflict in religious terms may provide access to 
organizational resources. Religious organizations were turned into conflict 
organizations in several conflicts during the last four decades. In Maluku, for 
example, both sides had established headquarters in Kota Ambon, the capital of 
the province of Maluku. The Christian headquarter, which was located in the 
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Maranatha Church, served as a communication and crisis center. The church 
provided a network connecting Christian communities across the province, 
which facilitated the recruitment of combatants and the coordination of 
Christian troops. The Muslims had their headquarters in the Al Fatah Mosque, 
a stone’s throw from the Maranatha church. From there, the armed struggle 
was organized under the auspices of retired military personnel. The Mosque 
also served as a communication center, hospital and a safe haven for refugees 
(Van Klinken, 2007). Homeless people lived more or less permanently in 
the churches and the mosques during the conflict, and the mere sight of the 
refugees strengthened the morale on both sides (Lindgren, 2014).
Armed conflicts require, of course, a large number of dedicated fighters. For conflict 
groups, it is important to identify people who are willing to make great sacrifices 
for long-term goals. To recruit people who are not sufficiently motivated 
often leads to problems as they tend to expect more short-term rewards than 
more motivated soldiers (Weinstein, 2005). There is ample of evidence that 
young men tend to be more motivated to participate in intergroup violence 
than any other demographic group (e.g., Mesquida & Wiener, 1996; 1999; 
Reedy-Maschner & Maschner, 1999). Recruitment for an armed conflict thus 
does not require a large population base but a pool of young males, which many 
religious organizations can provide through “block recruitment”. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that leaders typically address young males in their recruitment 
campaigns, and that many religious conflict groups are dominated by males 
under the age of 30 (e.g., Bose, 2003; Brass, 2003; McKenna, 1998).
To mobilize successfully, leaders must effectively manage two processes: 
consensus mobilization and action mobilization (Klandermans, 1984). 
Consensus mobilization is the process through which a conflict organizer 
attempts to convince people that a violent conflict is necessary and justified. Conflict 
groups promote such interpretations by disseminating collective action 
frames. As I said above, collective action frames are perceived more positively if 
they resonate with people’s beliefs and values and the wider cultural context 
in which a conflict group operates. Incorporation of religious concepts, 
symbols, and metaphors into collective action frames is often a part of 
alignment processes. They can justify the cause, which bring hope in times of 
misery and purpose in times of despair, and they can help to dehumanize the 
enemy, which makes it easier to kill them.
Action mobilization is the process through which a conflict organizer 
attempts to motivate people to participate in a religious conflict. It includes 
promoting sympathy for the cause among the population, targeting 
sympathizers within the population, motivating the sympathizers, and 
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persuading them to participate in the conflict. Sympathy, which is typically 
the result of consensus mobilization, is based on people’s identification with 
a conflict group. Identification is cheap and most people who identify with 
a cause tend to remain passive sympathizers. Leaders often target and 
motivate sympathizers by using kinship terms in the mobilizing rhetoric, 
such as “brother” and “sister”. It was used by both factions during the 
religious conflict in Maluku. For example, Jafar Umar Thalib, the commander 
of Laskar Jihad, emphasized in the declaration of war that it was a religious duty 
for all Muslims to take up arms to defend their “brothers in faith”:
What law in this world can oppose Allah’s law when Allah states that we 
are obliged to fight to defend the oppressed people who cannot 
defend themselves? And what earthly law can prohibit the religious 
obligation expressed in the command of Allah, “And if they, your 
brothers in faith, ask you for your help, then you are ordained to help 
them.” Therefore, I state emphatically that all laws and regulations that 
oppose Allah’s commandments are actually invalid (Lindgren, 2014).
To induce a feeling of fictive kinship reduces the social complexity within the 
conflict group, strengthen the ties between the group members, and reinforce 
the differences between the conflicting parties.
Another way to motivate people is to evoke people’s anger by focusing on the 
victimization of in-group members in the rhetoric. Most conflict groups, like 
the conflicting parties in Maluku, are built around a deliberate cultivation 
of anger or hatred. It is well-known that inducement of anger is an effective 
way to overcome fear, which tend to de-activate collective action. When the 
individual overcomes fear, positive emotions often take over, such as 
enthusiasm, which can generate a hope that risky behaviors will have 
positive outcomes (Huddy, Feldman & Cassese, 2007). Conflict groups 
need motivated people who are willing to expose themselves to great 
risks. Religions can be important in this regard when they justify the cause 
and promise heavenly rewards to those who die in battle. Religious beliefs 
and practices may strengthen the solidarity with the conflict, and help to 
overcome the collective action problem. Members of conflict groups must 
trust each other. Religion can build trust by demanding hard to fake 
rituals that signals commitment to the group (Sosis, Kress & Boster, 2007), 
and the activation of god concepts can help conflict groups to solve free-
rider problems (Johnson, 2016). It is thus strategic to refer to religion in the 
mobilizing rhetoric.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have reviewed some of the core concepts of social 
movement theory that can – and do – contribute to a contextual 
understanding of religious conflicts. The social movement theory framework 
locates religious conflicts within broader contexts and complex processes 
by focusing on the interplay between micro and meso factors and the ways 
in which people perceive macro factors, such as economic inequality, state 
repression and political exclusion. Adoption of such a framework can reveal how 
beliefs change as a consequence of participation in group dynamics. I suggest 
that the power of religion lies primarily in its mobilizing potential. Religious 
conflicts are elite-driven processes. Conflict organizers use religious concepts 
and symbols because they are efficient tools to mobilize human and non-
human resources. And some aspects of religion may help conflicting parties 
overcome the collective action problem associated with intergroup violence, 
including the human tendency to free- ride and to leave the fighting to 
others. Thus, religion is as much a consequence as a cause of intergroup 
conflicts.
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